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Abstract
Identification of missing persons from mass disasters is based on evaluation of a number of variables and
observations regarding the combination of features derived from these variables. DNA typing now is playing a
more prominent role in the identification of human remains, and particularly so for highly decomposed and
fragmented remains. The strength of genetic associations, by either direct or kinship analyses, is often quantified by
calculating a likelihood ratio. The likelihood ratio can be multiplied by prior odds based on nongenetic evidence to
calculate the posterior odds, that is, by applying Bayes’ Theorem, to arrive at a probability of identity. For the
identification of human remains, the path creating the set and intersection of variables that contribute to the prior
odds needs to be appreciated and well defined. Other than considering the total number of missing persons, the
forensic DNA community has been silent on specifying the elements of prior odds computations. The variables
include the number of missing individuals, eyewitness accounts, anthropological features, demographics and other
identifying characteristics. The assumptions, supporting data and reasoning that are used to establish a prior
probability that will be combined with the genetic data need to be considered and justified. Otherwise, data may
be unintentionally or intentionally manipulated to achieve a probability of identity that cannot be supported and
can thus misrepresent the uncertainty with associations. The forensic DNA community needs to develop guidelines
for objectively computing prior odds.
Background
Mass disasters can result from natural, accidental and
intentional causes. One of the tragedies of such events is
loss of lives. Many jurisdictions seek to identify the victims
so they can be returned to their respective families, for
investigative purposes and/or for legal reasons (for exam-
ple, resolution of estates, probate and criminal investiga-
tions). As in other forensic applications, identification is a
matter of evaluating variables to reduce the pool of candi-
dates with the intent of approaching individualization.
Various characteristics or traits are used to assist in the
identification of the human remains, including but not
limited to skeletal features (for example, sex, age, stature
and ancestry), dental comparisons, fingerprints, distin-
guishing marks (for example, tattoos and scars), medical
devices and implants, other unique features, DNA profiles
and, to a much lesser extent, eyewitness accounts and
sometimes personal items. However, the frequency of the
observed value of each variable needs to be assessed
appropriately to effectively reduce the candidate pool.
Current practice and possible limitations
For the past two decades, DNA typing has played a more
prominent role in the identification of human remains,
and particularly so for highly decomposed and fragmen-
ted remains [1-12]. DNA profiles from recovered uniden-
tified human remains may be compared with direct
reference samples (for example, toothbrush, razor and
hairbrush) and/or profiles from relatives (that is, an indir-
ect comparison or kinship analysis) to identify possible
associations. The strength of the genetic associations is
often quantified by calculating a likelihood ratio (LR).
T h eL Ri su s e dt oe v a l u a t ew h e t h e rt h e r ei se v i d e n c et o
support a specified biological relationship or direct iden-
tification. The literature is replete with approaches to cal-
culating the LRs for direct and kinship analyses [5,13-23]
and therefore need not be discussed further herein.
The genetic evidence (that is, LR) can be combined
with nongenetic evidence (summarized into a numerical
value called “prior odds”) to evaluate the probability of
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is
Posterior odds = Likelihood ratio × prior odds. (1)
Thus, the prior odds figure into the ultimate posterior
odds, and decisions are made on the basis of the poster-
ior odds. Though the above translation of LR into poster-
ior odds is simple, the multiplication of LR with prior
odds implies that judgments or considerations used to
set the prior odds must be independent of observations
used in computing the LR. Consequently, the path creat-
ing the set and intersection of variables that contribute to
the prior odds needs to be appreciated and well defined.
Equally important is that the values used for the prior
odds should be defensible. Assumptions regarding the
frequency of the variables, especially without data, and
the belief in the independence of variables may or may
not be defensible. Serious thought and caution are war-
ranted when providing prior odds or probability.
A typical scenario in mass dis a s t e r si st h a tt h ep r i o r
probability is based on the known total number of miss-
ing persons or victims. In missing person cases with a
pool of v victims, the prior probability is 1/v,a n dt h e
prior odds for a specific missing person is 1/(v -1 ) ,i f
no further information is provided and all missing per-
sons are treated equally. The posterior odds is p/(1-p),
where p is the posterior probability or probability of
identity. Equation (1) can also be written as equation (2)
p
1 − p
= LR ×
1
v − 1
(2)
A minimum threshold is set for an assertion regarding
the probability of identity, for example, at 99.9% certainty
for a posterior probability. The threshold is set by policy,
but is a balance between maximizing identifications and
minimizing false identifications [2,5,14]. Formally, the
choice of a threshold for the posterior probability of
identity is a matter of weighing the costs of false deci-
sions. The requirement of a very high posterior probabil-
ity (that is, > 99.9%) implies that obtaining false-positives
is deemed worse than obtaining false-negatives. For given
LR and v values, the distribution of the posterior prob-
ability (P) is shown in Table 1. For example, with 100
missing persons and a LR of 10
5 for a specific missing
person association with a putative family, the posterior
probability is greater than 99.9% certainty that the miss-
ing person belongs to the family. In general, for any fixed
LR value, the higher the prior odds (for example, the
lower the v value), the higher is the power of identifica-
tion (that is, higher posterior odds). Thus, the limitations
on reaching the prescribed threshold for probability of
identity are low prior odds, the quality and quantity of
DNA and, for kinship analyses, reference samples from
informative relatives (the limitations of the latter two, in
general, yield low LRs). In addition, the lack of a good
chain of custody on antemortem biological samples can
reduce the overall strength of the evidence.
There has been some discussion in the literature
about establishing the prior probability in mass disaster
cases which recommends that it be based on the total
number of unidentified victims and defining the popula-
tion as open or closed [2,5,14]. For closed population
cases, such as a plane crash, the number of victims (v)
often is quantifiable. For open population cases, v is
estimated and carries less certainty than for closed
population cases, but is often manageable. As an exam-
ple of setting a prior probability, in the aftermath of the
attack on the World Trade Center (WTC), it was deter-
mined that a little less than 3,000 people died in the dis-
aster [2]. The prior probability was set at approximately
1/3,000 [2] and could have been updated as identifica-
tions were made or increased by using gender [2]. Other
nongenetic information often could not be included into
the prior probability, because the vast majority of
remains were severely fragmented.
Establishing the prior probability in cases of war or
genocide is similar in principle to the WTC example,
but there has been little guidance regarding the esti-
mates. Indeed, while the forensic DNA community has
made recommendations for using Bayes’ Theorem, they
have not addressed the variables that should be consid-
ered when establishing prior odds (beyond using the
total number of missing persons) [29]. Because of a lack
Table 1 Distribution of the posterior probability (P) with a given LR and number of victims (v)
Likelihood ratio (LR)
Prior odds = 1/(v - 1) 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
1/(10-1) 0.917431 0.99108 0.999101 0.99991 0.999991
1/(50-1) 0.671141 0.953289 0.995124 0.99951 0.999951
1/(100-1) 0.502513 0.909918 0.990197 0.999011 0.999901
1/(500-1) 0.166945 0.667111 0.952472 0.995035 0.999501
1/(1,000-1) 0.090992 0.50025 0.909174 0.990109 0.999002
1/(2,000-1) 0.047642 0.333444 0.833403 0.980402 0.998005
1/(5,000-1) 0.019612 0.166694 0.666711 0.95239 0.995026
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ing prior probabilities in such missing persons cases
may not have been applied legitimately and thus at least
warrant further discussion. For obvious reasons, we
refrain herein from discussing cases still under delibera-
tion; however, the following example from the literature
illustrates the importance of objective specifications of
prior odds.
Zupanič Pajnič et al. [30] used a prior probability of 1/89
for 88 missing victims of a post-World War II massacre in
Slovenia. The number of victims was based on documents,
but the authors suggested that some of the victims might
reside in another site. Not all the remains could be identi-
fied. They did not consider the uncertainty that some of
the victims other than the missing 88 might reside in the
burial site. Thus, the prior probability of 1/89 might be
too high.
Primarily, our discussion mainly involves considera-
tions in formulating the prior odds (or prior probability)
for missing persons identifications; these should be
equally applicable to other scenarios as well. For exam-
ple, some of the issues discussed herein have been raised
in the context of forensic speaker recognition from voice
recordings evidence data [31]. The intention is to raise
awareness, and hence discussion, within the human
identity community to address this gap that needs bet-
ter-defined guidelines.
In instances of war or genocide, human remains typi-
cally are not found in one site but are distributed among
multiple sites, manifests often are not available (and, if
available, may not be entirely reliable) and bodies may
have been moved. Anthropological data, eyewitness
accounts and geography have been used to establish prior
probability. Before the DNA evidence is analyzed, prior
probability is established about the correctness of the
hypothesis that the sample is from a particular victim. The
prior probability should reflect reasonable beliefs about an
event before receiving new information, such as the
genetic evidence. Importantly, prior probability should be
e s t a b l i s h e db e f o r et h eg e n e t i cd a t aa r eo b t a i n e d ,a st h e
two values, prior odds and LR, are to be combined under
the assumption of independence. Prior probabilities can
be updated with new information. The simplest and most
scientifically defensible approach is reducing the v value as
identifications are made.
In mass grave situations, eyewitness accounts have
been used by some to assert ap r i o r ithat an individual
was buried at a particular site. An anthropological assess-
ment of the burial site remains determines that a mini-
mum number of n individuals are at the burial site. The
prior probability of that specific individual being at that
site is then set at 1/n. As shown in Table 1, increasing
the prior probability substantially from 1/v to 1/n can
affect the posterior odds and, in some cases, can enable
meeting a prescribed threshold. Thus, there is an incen-
tive to reduce v to as small an n as possible. However,
setting the prior probability at 1/n assumes that an eye-
witness account is 100% accurate, an assumption that is
hardly defensible. Scheck et al. [32] found that mistaken
eyewitness accounts were a factor in 82% of wrongful
convictions relying on eyewitness accounts, with the
defendant subsequently being exonerated by DNA typing.
Perceptions are distorted by the chaos and duress of the
observational context and the individual limitations of
the observer. However, such accounts might be consid-
ered if corroborated by mutually independent accounts.
In situations where the DNA evidence demonstrates that
a burial site population does not contain the reported
individual, the prior probability of 1/n is rejected; such
rejection of an association within a burial site in itself
demonstrates a lack of 100% accuracy in an eyewitness
account. Some lower prior probability should be selected
that is bounded by 1/v,w h e r ev is the total number of
missing persons.
In the above-described scenario, the prior probability
clearly is a range between 1/v and 1/n (where n may be
somewhat uncertain because of conditions within the site
but where, for simplicity of argument, it is assumed to be
correct). It might be more appropriate to provide a range
to the fact finder or official responsible for assigning
identity, as this would fairly convey that there is some
degree of uncertainty. Forensic scientists tend to be
reluctant to convey such uncertainty, either because the
uncertainty is not appreciated [28,33] or because they
believe the uncertainty will create confusion. A prior
probability of 1/v is conservative and more defensible.
Alternatively, the prior probability could be updated in
the above-described scenario as 1/(v-n) [14]. Assuming
that samples from each victim at the burial site yielded
sufficient genetic information to eliminate the specific
victim from being at that site, the prior probability could
be bounded by the remaining number of unidentified vic-
tims. The adjustment of 1/(v-n) may seem trivial but in
some scenarios could be substantial and, more impor-
tantly, can be scientifically defensible. Evaluation of the
strength of the evidence can be more complicated
because of variation in the structure of the reference
f a m i l i e sa n ds h o u l db ec o n s i d e r e d( b u ti sn o td i s c u s s e d
herein).
Data on the accuracy of eyewitness accounts are not
available. Instead of DNA scientists and anthropologists
providing the prior probability including an eyewitness
account, the official who makes the decision about iden-
tity could be given the range of 1/v and 1/n,a n dh eo r
she could apply his or her belief in the level of confidence
of the eyewitness account. This approach prevents the
scientist from providing a prior probability that is not
readily estimated. However, it still does not obviate the
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accounts in chaotic or traumatic events; that is, corro-
boration, observer skills, credibility, independent
accounts, how much accuracy decays over the time of the
event and accounting of the incident, and so on. The offi-
cial still would need the supporting data to select the best
prior probability. The data to be collected are in some
respects similar to the prior probabilities used in athlete
doping [34]. Eyewitness data would likely be an average
of witness accuracy, regardless of other influencing vari-
ables. A better estimate would be performance by the
particular witness over multiple traumatic or challenging
events. Unfortunately, the latter information cannot be
practically obtained. Because of the number of variables
that are likely to affect each witness in varying scenarios,
a good prior probability for an eyewitness account might
not be attainable and would not likely be uniformly dis-
tributed. More discussion on the use of eyewitness
accounts in determining the prior probability is
warranted.
While the above discussion focuses on the inaccuracy of
eyewitness accounts, other assumptions that have been
used to contribute to increasing the prior probability can
be misleading and/or have been misused in missing per-
sons identifications. These include location, open vs.
closed properties, postmortem interval (PMI) and demo-
graphic variables often combined using the product rule.
Law enforcement officers and other investigators (includ-
ing some anthropologists) have based prior probabilities
on assumptions about where the remains were found. For
example, a decedent is deemed to be a member of a subset
of a population of border crossers. People residing near
borders can share a number of characteristics, and thus
the candidate population may be greater. Prior probabil-
ities should reflect the uncertainty of population affinity
where assumptions about borders are inferred to reduce v.
In addition, restricting a candidate population to the geo-
graphic region where the individual was last seen during a
war does not reflect the possibility of transport of indivi-
duals into and out of that region.
The topic of closed and open populations has been
addressed somewhat for mass disasters and does not
need further discussion per se. However, other popula-
tion factors should be considered. For example, anthro-
pologists, odontologists and others use airplane manifests
or other transportation manifests to establish 1/v and
proceed to establish an antemortem database on the
basis of the manifests. This database may not be accurate
if some of the decedents falsified their identities, clearly a
potential practice when the individuals are instrumental
in the cause of the incident. Alternatively, consider how
many “Mr Smiths” travel to Las Vegas every year. Data-
bases need to be assessed and curated continuously.
PMI has been used to reduce 1/v in situations where a
portion of the dead were killed within a particular time
period. For example, 500 individuals may have been
murdered during a one-year period and buried at a site,
yet 5,000 people may have died over a ten-year period
that overlaps the period of the mass murders. Separating
the 500 individuals to set 1/v at 1/500 may not be
defensible without substantial information that is often
soft in such scenarios. PMIs are less reliable for inter-
mediate-and long-term ranges than they are for recent
time periods (hours or days) [35].
Demographic characteristics sometimes are used to
reduce 1/v. Consider unidentified human remains found
near a town of N inhabitants. An assumption might be
made that 1/v is bounded by 1/N. Then attempts may be
made to reduce 1/v by gender, age, stature, population affi-
nity and so forth to increase the prior probability. Estimat-
ing the prior probability is not justified by applying the
product rule of estimates of the assumed frequencies of
the variables without supporting data from the geographic
region. Not all demographic variables are independent
[36,37], and they can be location-dependent (for example,
gender at a women’s prison is a nested variable).
Indeed, this practice of assuming independence of
demographic characteristics is somewhat similar to what
was proffered in the infamous California v Collins case in
1968 [38]. Collins and his wife were accused of a second-
degree robbery, and to convey Collins’s guilt, the prose-
cutor entered into evidence via an expert in mathematics
some “demographic” data (Table 2). The product rule
was applied to combine the factors, and a probability was
derived that only 1 in 12 million couples would present
these particular characteristics. It should be fairly obvious
that these characteristics may not be independent. For
example, it would seem plausible that a man with a beard
would be more likely to have a mustache than these two
characteristics being mutually independent (although
that plausibility is an assumption that we have made as
well). Upon appeal, the court overturned the conviction
because the values for each characteristic were estimated
Table 2 The characteristics and frequencies used in
California v Collins
a
Characteristic Estimated frequency
Partly yellow automobile 1/10
Man with mustache 1/4
Girl with ponytail 1/10
Girl with blond hair 1/3
Negro man with beard 1/10
Interracial couple 1/1,000
aData are derived from [38]. The combined probability under the assumption
of independence that was presented in court was 1/12,000,000.
Budowle et al. Investigative Genetics 2011, 2:15
http://www.investigativegenetics.com/content/2/1/15
Page 4 of 6without any supporting data and were assumed to be
independent without any basis. Interestingly, the appel-
late court also raised the issue that the probability evi-
dence did not factor into the reliability of an eyewitness
a c c o u n t( a sd i s c u s s e da b o v e )a n dd i dn o tt a k ei n t o
account other factors, such as a robber wearing a dis-
guise. Clearly, the same principles of combining demo-
graphic information to raise the prior probability apply to
missing persons identifications were used in the Collins
case. It is disconcerting that 40 years after the Collins
case, similar misuse of data to establish prior probabilities
in missing persons cases may still be occurring.
Lastly, the estimated age (mean age ± 1 standard devia-
tion (SD)) has been used to reduce v. For example, the
estimated age of the unidentified person could be reported
as 50 ± 10 years based on examination of the morphologi-
cal staging of the pubic symphyseal face. On the basis of
this range, only individuals who were reported missing
and were between the ages of 40 and 60 years were used
to set the prior probability. Such an approach underesti-
mates the number of individuals who should be included
in establishing the prior probability. While there are sev-
eral methods for estimating age and several data sets, for
illustration purposes, we refer to the Suchey-Brooks
method and data reported by Brooks and Suchey [39] and
Katz and Suchey [40,41], who examined morphological
changes of the pubic symphyseal region as an indicator of
age at death. The data show that the range of uncertainty
increases with the age of the remains. Estimation of age
based on the morphology of the pubic symphyseal region
is more reliable in individuals younger than 40 years of
age (confirmed for Japanese, see [42]). Standard deviations
increased notably for individuals over 45 years of age. Katz
and Suchey [40,41] reported a mean age of 45.6 years with
a 1 SD value of 10.4 years for males. This is similar to the
value of 50 ± 10 years presented above. Yet, a range based
on a ± 1 SD interval is not the same as the 95% confidence
range, which is 27 to 66 years. While an age estimation of
50 ± 10 years is useful for prioritizing an investigation, it is
not proper for eliminating all individuals younger than 40
and older than 60 years old. Prioritization for investigation
does not translate equally to uncertainty regarding the age
of remains. Also, there are suggestions that estimates
would be more reliable if population affinity data were
used [42,43]. Age estimates based on populations that do
not represent the unidentified person also may carry more
uncertainty. Likewise, similar uncertainties are relevant for
estimating other anthropometric features on the basis of
the skeletal remains of unidentified persons (for example,
estimation of stature from skeletal remains [44]).
Conclusion
A few examples have been provided of potential misuse
of data to set a prior probability. More examples could
have been provided, but the discussion herein is suffi-
cient to make those involved in the identification of
missing persons aware of the issues that may affect the
establishment of prior probabilities. There should be
agreement that it is not appropriate to assume 100%
accuracy of an eyewitness account, that some demo-
graphic variables are not independent, that setting a
prior probability at 1/n or assuming anthropological
data are uniformly distributed may not be defensible
and that it is necessary to have supporting data when
invoking the frequency of occurrence of characteristics.
Those involved in identifying human remains should be
cognizant of these constraints and be cautious when
establishing prior probabilities. These uncertainties
should be considered when establishing identity, and
officials (who are not scientifically adept) should be
apprised of the limitations of prior probabilities so that
processes can be carried out as reliably as possible. The
human identity community should establish guidelines
regarding objective formulations of prior odds.
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